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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The Caton decision is properly strict, especially in view of the in-
herent weakness of service by publication in giving notice to the defen-
dant of an impending action.'8
ARTICLE 6- JOINDER OF CLAIMS, CONSOLIDATION AND SEVERANCE
CPLR 602: Degree of responsibility attributable to each defendant for
similar injuries suffered by a plaintiff in separate automobile accidents
held to justify joint trial.
CPLR 602 bestows upon the courts broad discretionary power to
join the trials of separate actions, upon motion, when they involve "a
common question of law or fact."' 9 Thayer v. Collett20 illustrates the
application of this permissive standard.21 Therein, the Appellate Divi-
sion, Third Department, held that where a plaintiff had instituted sep-
arate actions to recover for similar injuries allegedly sustained in two
automobile accidents occurring a year apart, it was not an improper
exercise of discretion to grant the motion of one of the defendants for
a joint trial; The court found that the degree of responsibility attrib-
utable to each defendant for the alleged injuries constituted a common
question of fact, and that a determination of this question by a joint
trial would be fairer to both the plaintiff and the defendants since it
would prevent a litigating defendant from seeking to cast blame for the
injuries on the absent defendants. 22
This decision is sound. When, as in Thayer, a joint trial will serve
to preserve the rights of the parties, its use should be encouraged as an
effective means of expediting litigation and avoiding the inconsistent
verdicts that may result from a multiplicity of suits. 23
CPLR 602: Second Department recommends trial preference when
summary proceeding consolidated with action.
The CPLR appears to permit the consolidation of a plenary action
with a special proceeding,24 and a majority of New York courts have so
77 N.Y.S. 959 (4th Dep't 1902); Alfonso v. Alfonso, 99 Misc. 550, 165 N.Y.S. 1037 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1917).
18 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 US. 371, 382 (1971).
19 CPLR 602(a). See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 602, commentary at 116 (1963). See gener-
ally Boyea v. Lambeth, 33 App. Div. 2d 928, 306 N.YS.2d 481 (3d Dep't 1970) (mem.).
Note that CPLR 602 liberalizes the CPA requirement for joinder, i.e., that the actions
grow out of the same set of facts. Compare CPA 96-a and Abbatepaolo v. Blumberg, 7 App.
Div. 2d 847, 182 N.Y.S.2d 83 (2d Dep't 1959) (mem.), with CPLR 602(a) and Wyant v.
Jensen, 25 App. Div. 2d 388, 270 N.YS.2d 156 (3d Dep't 1966).
2041 App. Div. 2d 581, 340 N.Y.S.2d 16 (3d Dep't 1973) (mem.).
21 See Wyant v. Jensen, 25 App. Div. 2d 388, 270 N.Y.S.2d 156 (3d Dep't 1966); Potter v
Clark, 19 App. Div. 2d 585, 240 N.Y.S.2d 495 (4th Dep't 1963) (mem.). But see Kom v
Duhl, 22 App. Div. 2d 793, 253 N.Y.S.2d 874 (2d Dep't 1964) (mem.).
22 41 App. Div. 2d at 581, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
23 See 2 WK&M 602.01.
24 CPLR 602(a) provides for the consolidation of "actions" involving common questions
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held.25 A difficulty arises, however, in the case of one variety of special
proceeding - the summary proceeding.26 How can the expediency of a
summary proceeding be preserved in the lengthy procedural context of
an action when the two are consolidated?
In McCarthy v. Lewin,27 the vendors of real property brought a
contract action and a separate summary proceeding against their vendees
who had taken possession of the property sold.28 Reversing a lower
court order, the Appellate Division, Second Department, unanimously
granted the defendants' motion to consolidate on the ground that the
action and the proceeding involved the same issues of fact and law. To
preserve the vendors' right to a speedy adjudication in the summary
proceeding, the court recommended that a motion by either party for
a trial preference be granted, and that noticing for trial not be delayed
by pretrial proceedings.29
The court's decision prevents duplication of proceedings while, to
some extent, preserving the summary nature of the proceeding which
the plaintiffs were entitled to bring.
ARTICLE 11 - POOR PERSONS
CPLR 1102: Local governments must pay indigent matrimonial plain-
tiffs' publication costs.
While CPLR 1102 does not expressly provide for public payment
of indigents' publication costs in matrimonial actions, 30 the United
of law br fact. CPLR 105(b) states that "[t]he word 'action' includes a 'special proceeding.'"
Consolidation is facilitated by CPLR 103(b), which makes the procedure in special proceed-
ings the same as the procedure in actions except where otherwise prescribed by law.
25 Elias v. Artistic Paper Box Co., 29 App. Div. 2d 118, 286 N.Y.S.2d 371 (2d Dep't
1967); Schuster v. 490 West End Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 535, 271 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1st Dep't
1966) (mem.); Street of Shops, Inc. v. Clifford, 20 App. Div. 2d 622, 244 N.Y.S.2d 858 (4th
Dep't 1963) (mem.); cf. In re Houston's Trust, 30 App. Div. 2d 999, 294 N.YS.2d 225 (3d
Dep't 1968) (mem.). Contra, Hanft v. Hanft, 46 Misc. 2d 548, 260 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct.
Bronx County 1965).
26 RPAPL 701(1) refers to a summary proceeding to recover real property as a
"special proceeding."
27 41 App. Div. 2d 657, 340 N.Y.S.2d 668 (2d Dep't 1973) (mem.).
28 RPAPL 713(9) allows a vendor, in certain circumstances, to bring a summary
proceeding against a defaulting vendee.
29 Accord, Street of Shops, Inc. v. Clifford, 20 App. Div. 2d 622, 244 N.Y.S.2d 858 (4th
Dep't 1963) (mem.).
30 CPLR 1102(d) exempts a poor person from liability for "costs and fees" except
when he recovers in the action. Courts have reached opposite conclusions as to whether
the statute covers publication costs in matrimonial actions. See Brown v. Wyman, 59 Misc.
2d 740, 300 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1969) (statute sanctions payment of
publication costs by county); Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1968), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. R.Et. 135, 139
(1969), rev'd on other grounds, 38 App. Div. 2d 431, 330 N.Y.S.2d 550 (2d Dep't 1972),
discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. R v. 148, 162 (1972) (statute does not
authorize payment of publication costs).
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